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Luca Benati
University of Bern†
Abstract
Schularick and Taylor (2012) documented a sizeable increase in the ratio
between credit and broad money since the end of WWII, which they interpreted
in terms of a progressive disconnect between the two aggregates. I show that
this interpretation is incorrect, since, as I demonstrate mathematically, this
evidence is uninformative for the issue at hand. In fact, Jordà, Schularick
and Taylor’s (JST) data show that, since the XIX century, fluctuations in
broad money and credit have exhibited an extraordinarily strong correlation
within each single country in the dataset, to the point that (e.g.) either Shin’s
(1994) or Wright’s (2000) test consistently detects cointegration between the
multipliers of the two aggregates. I also show that, after WWII, there has
been no change in the relative prediction power of credit and broad money for
financial crises compared to the pre-WWII period, and that the change in the
multiplier of either aggregate has been more powerful than credit growth, the
variable considered by Schularick and Taylor.
My results imply that (1) for the ‘traditional’ banking sector there has been
no change, since WWI, in the relationship between its monetary liabilities, and
the amount of credit it extends to the private non-financial sector; and (2)
only the comparatively recent ascent of the ‘shadow’ banking sector–which is
not covered by either JST’s, or the Bank for International Settlements’ data–
introduced a ‘wedge’ between broad money and credit. Contrary to Schularick
and Taylor’s interpretation, the ascent of ‘shadow banking’ is the only reason
why, today, we live in the ‘Age of Credit’.
∗I wish to thank Robert Lucas for useful suggestions, Peter Ireland for helpful discussions on
money multipliers, and Edward Nelson for comments. Thanks to Alberto Musso and Athanassios
Boudalis for kindly providing data for the Euro area and Greece, respectively. Usual disclaimers
apply.
†Department of Economics, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3001, Bern, Switzer-
land. Email: luca.benati@vwi.unibe.ch
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the evolution of the structure of the financial
system over the last several decades has been one of the most intensely investigated
issues in macroeconomics. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2012; henceforth
ST) have documented a significant increase in the ratio between credit and broad
money since the end of WWII, which they have interpreted in terms of a progressive
disconnect between the two aggregates over the last seven decades:
‘The first important fact that emerges from the data is the presence of
two distinct “eras of finance capitalism” [...]. [T]he first financial era lasted
from 1870 to WW2. In this era, money and credit were volatile but over
the long run they maintained a roughly stable relationship to each other [...].
Thus, during the first era of finance capitalism, up to 1939, the era studied
by canonical monetarists like Friedman and Schwartz, the “money view” of
the world looks entirely reasonable. Banks’ liabilities were first and foremost
monetary, and exhibited a fairly stable relationship to total credit. [...] The
relationships changed dramatically in the post-1945 period. [...] [C]redit not
only grew strongly relative to GDP, but also relative to broad money after
WW2, via a combination of higher leverage and (after the 1970s) through the
use of new sources of funding, mainly debt securities, creating more and more
nonmonetary bank liabilities.’ 1
Very similar evidence has subsequently been produced in a series of joint pa-
pers with Oscar Jordà,2 based on an expanded version of ST’s original dataset.
Since Jordà, Schularick and Taylor’s (JST) data only cover the ‘traditional’ (i.e.,
non ‘market-based’, or ‘shadow’) banking sector, their results should be thought of–
under their interpretation–as understating the true extent of disconnect between
broad money and credit since the end of WWII.3
1.1 Main results
This paper contains three main results:
First, I show that ST’s interpretation of the evolution of the ratio between credit
and broad money is incorrect, since–as I demonstrate mathematically–this evidence
is uninformative for the issue of whether, since WWII, credit has, or has not become
disconnected from broad money. The intuition is straightforward. Assume, just for
the sake of the argument, that the logarithm of broad money, , is a random-walk
with drift,4 and that log credit, , is cointegrated with log money,  = ++ ,
1See Schularick and Taylor (2012, pp. 1034-1036).
2See in particular Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015, 2017).
3This is, e.g., ST’s (2012) interpretation: see their footnote 7, p. 1036.
4The argument also holds if  features a deterministic time trend.
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Figure 1a  Multipliers of total loans and broad money for individual countries 
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Figure 1b  Multipliers of total loans and broad money for individual countries 
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Figure 1c  Multipliers of total loans and broad money for individual countries 
 
 
where the notation is obvious, and  is I(0). Unless  = 1, the logarithm of the
ratio between credit and money,  −  =  + ( − 1) + , will have a unit
root, thus pointing–under ST’s interpretation–towards a ‘disconnect’ between the
two aggregates. The implication is that ST’s evidence bears no implication for the
issue at hand, and it therefore cannot be taken to imply a decoupling, since WWII,
between the traditional banking system’s monetary liabilities and the amount of loans
it extends to the private non-financial sector.
Second, working with JST’s dataset I show that, since the Gold Standard era,
fluctuations in broad money and credit have exhibited an extraordinarily strong cor-
relation within each single country. The correlation between the two aggregates’ fluc-
tuations is so strong, especially at the low frequencies, that (e.g.) either Shin’s (1994)
or Wright’s (2000) test consistently detects cointegration between their multipliers,
defined as the ratio between either aggregate and the monetary base.5. Crucially, this
has held not only up until WWII, but also over the entire post-WWII period. For
nineteen countries not featured in JST’s dataset I produce qualitatively the same ev-
idence based on credit data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).6 The
simplest and most powerful illustration of the strength of the relationship between
fluctuations in broad money and credit since the second half of the XIX century is
provided by the joint evolution of either the multipliers, or the rates of growth of the
two aggregates, in the 36 countries I consider, which is shown in Figures 1-1, and in
Figures A.1-A.1 in the online Appendix,7 respectively. The evidence speaks for it-
self: the notion that, after WWII, credit may have become ‘disconnected’ from broad
money is manifestly incorrect. Statistical analysis–based on either country-and-year
fixed-effects regressions, frequency-domain methods, or cointegration tests–will sim-
ply confirm what the visual evidence so starkly suggests.
Third, I show that based on the same metric used by ST–i.e., the area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve–after WWII () changes in the
multipliers of either credit or broad money have been more powerful at predicting fi-
nancial crises than credit growth (the variable originally studied by ST); and () there
has been no change in the relative prediction power of the two aggregates, compared
to the pre-WWII period. Both before, and after WWII credit had, and has exhibited
a slightly greater prediction power than broad money for financial crisis. However,
although after WWII the prediction power of both aggregates has increased compared
to the pre-WWII period, their relative prediction power has remained unchanged.
5See e.g. Brunner and Meltzer (1990) and Modigliani and Papademos (1990).
6The BIS data, like JST’s data, only cover the traditional banking sector. As I discuss in
Section 1.2.1, the fact that neither dataset covers the ‘market-based’ banking sector has important
implications for the interpretation of my evidence, as well as of JST’s.
7The online appendix is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/lucabenatiswebpage.
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1.2 Implications
My results have two main substantive implications, and a methodological one.
1.2.1 Traditional banks, the ascent of ‘shadow banks’, and the transition
from the ‘Age of Money’ to the ‘Age of Credit’
A first implication is that ST’s characterization of the transition from the ‘Age of
Money’ to the ‘Age of Credit’ is fundamentally incorrect. In contrast with ST’s
conclusions, my evidence clearly demonstrates that, for the traditional banking sector
covered by JST’s and the BIS ’ data, there has been no material change since the Gold
Standard era in the relationship between broadmoney and credit. In turn, this implies
that only the comparatively recent, and dramatic ascent of the market-based banking
sector–which has been analyzed, e.g., by Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011),
and is not covered by either JST’s or the BIS ’ credit data–has introduced a ‘wedge’
between broad money and credit. Since shadow banks finance the loans they create
not by taking deposits from the public, but rather borrowing on capital markets,
such loans feature no corresponding monetary liability which could be counted as
part of broad money.8 As a result, every time shadow banks create a loan, they
automatically introduce a wedge between broad money and credit. As shown by
Adrian and Shin (2008, 2011), the assets of specific shadow-banking intermediaries–
in particular, brokers-dealers–do indeed possess a superior informational content for
macroeconomic fluctuations, compared to the assets of traditional banks. This is the
true reason why, today, we live in the ‘Age of Credit’, rather than the one given by
ST.
To sum up my own position, the ascent of shadow banking is the only reason why,
today, we live in the ‘Age of Credit’: if it were for the traditional banking sector–for
which the creation of broad money and credit has proceeded in lockstep since the
Gold Standard era–we would still be living in the ‘Age of Money’, and the ‘money
view’ would still be perfectly relevant. Another way of saying this is that, contrary
to ST’s position, the fundamental distinction is not between the two periods before
and after WWII, but rather between the traditional and the ‘market-based’ banking
sectors: the former still lives in the ‘Age of Money’, whereas the ascent of the latter
is the only reason why we live in the ‘Age of Credit’.
1.2.2 Interpreting the relationship between aggregate financial leverage
and macroeconomic stylized facts
My evidence also has implications for the interpretation of several results produced
by JST, pertaining to the relationship between aggregate financial leverage–which
they measure by the ratio between nominal loans and nominal GDP–and macro-
8If these data were systematically collected, which currently is not the case.
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economic stylized facts. In their NBER Macro Annuals paper,9 for example, JST
document how, since the second half of the XIX century, and especially since WWII,
leverage has been negatively correlated with the mean, skewness, and 10th percentile
of the distribution of real GDP growth per capita, thus implying that, e.g., higher
leverage has been associated with systematically deeper recessions. JST interpret
these findings as suggesting that more highly leveraged economies tend to experience
wider ‘boom and bust’ fluctuations, which result in comparatively deeper slumps.
JST’s interpretation is intuitively sensible, and might well be correct, but it is
not the only possible one. In the light of the extraordinarily strong correlation I
document between fluctuations in broad money and credit since the second half of
the XIX century, an alternative, and equally plausible interpretation is in terms of
monetary instability. This interpretation is in line with the old Monetarist literature–
exemplified, first and foremost, by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz’s (1963)
Monetary History of the United States–stressing the broad stability of monetary
relationships, and the dangers originating from instability in the monetary regime.
Under this interpretation, the changes in the properties of real GDP growth per capita
since the end of WWII (e.g., the fact that recessions have been systematically deeper)
has nothing to do with financial leverage per se, and it rather originates from the fact
that the very nature of post-WWII monetary regimes has caused broad money growth
to be higher, and more volatile than in the previous era.
My objective here is not to advocate in favor of either interpretation, but rather to
make the simple point that, based on this kind of evidence, either of them is equally
plausible.
1.2.3 On the relevance of money-multiplier analysis
As discussed (e.g.) by Brunner and Meltzer (1990) and Modigliani and Papademos
(1990), since the monetary base is under the control of the central bank, the multi-
pliers of broad money and credit fully characterize the amounts of the two aggregates
which are created by the interaction between the financial system and the public,
for a given ‘input’ of base money provided by the monetary authority.10 To put it
differently, the multipliers characterize an economy’s ‘technology’ for the ‘production’
of broad money and credit starting from a given ‘input’ of base money.
Money-multiplier analysis played a central role, first and foremost, in Friedman
and Schwartz’s Monetary History,11 but over subsequent years and decades it was
progressively abandoned, to the point that the money multiplier has almost faded
9See Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017).
10A small, but important qualification to this statement is that the monetary base can be defined
even in the absence of a monetary authority (e.g., for the United States before the creation of the
Federal Reserve system, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963)). This is why, throughout this paper, I
also report a few results for samples during which a specific country did not have a central bank.
11See, first and foremost, Chapter 7 (‘The Great Contraction’).
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from frontier research,12 and the very concept has fallen into near-oblivion.13
My results show that the abandonment of money-multiplier analysis was unwar-
ranted, and that this approach still has quite a lot to say. A key issue to stress is
the previously mentioned superior prediction power for financial crises, over the post-
WWII period, of changes in the multipliers of either broad money or credit, compared
to the two aggregates’ growth rates.
1.3 Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the
data, which are described in detail in online Appendix A. In section 3 I discuss
the main stylized facts pertaining to the evolution of broad money and credit since
the second half of the XIX century. In Section 4 I show mathematically that ST’s
interpretation of the increase in the ratio between credit and broad money sinceWWII
is incorrect. In Section 5 I explore the prediction power of broad money and credit
for financial crises. Section 6 concludes, and outlines directions for further research.
2 The Data
Throughout the entire paper I report results based on two alternative datasets: a ‘nar-
row’ one only comprises the seventeen countries featured in JST’s dataset,14 whereas
a ‘broader’ one also features nineteen additional countries.15 All of the data and their
sources are described in detail in online Appendix A. In this section I provide a brief
overview of the main features of the two datasets, and of the data sources.
For the seventeen countries in the narrow dataset, data on broad money, total
loans (i.e., credit), nominal GDP, and the price level are all from JST’s dataset.16
12Among the very few recent theoretical analyses of models featuring a money multiplier, see
Freeman and Kydland (2000) and Henriksen and Kydland (2010).
13E.g., whereas the 1990 Handbook of Monetary Economics featured extensive discussions of the
money multiplier–see Brunner and Meltzer (1990) and Modigliani and Papademos (1990)–neither
the subsequent 2011 edition, nor any edition of the Handbook of Macroeconomics even mentioned
it. To the very best of my knowledge, the only paper to have ever analyzed the money multiplier
based on modern time-series methods is Benati and Ireland (2017).
14The dataset is available from the internet at: http://www.macrohistory.net/data/. The 17
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
States.
15The additional countries are Argentina, Chile, South Korea, South Africa, New Zealand, the
Euro area, Russia, Brazil, India, Poland, Israel, Hungary, China, Czech Republic, Colombia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Greece, and Thailand.
16Baker, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2018) document how ST’s broad money data are sometimes
sub-optimal. In order to make this paper’s points as clear as possible, for the 17 countries in JST’s
dataset I exclusively use JST’s broad money data. In a previous version of the paper, however,
I considered an alternative set of monetary data, for which the sources are the same as Benati et
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As for the monetary base, the narrow monetary aggregate featured in JST’s dataset
(i.e., the series labelled as ‘narrowm’) is equal to the monetary base only for Norway,
Sweden, and the United States, whereas it is equal to M1 for all other countries–see
the description of JST’s data in Jordà et al. (2016). For Norway, Sweden, and the
United States I have therefore taken the monetary base from JST’s dataset, whereas
for the remaining fourteen countries I have taken it from national central banks’
websites or statistical publications (for details, see online Appendix A). For Belgium
and Denmark I was not able to find long-run series for the monetary base.17 For
these two countries I therefore only report results based on either the two aggregates’
growth rates, or their ratios with nominal GDP.
As for the remaining nineteen countries, data on total loans are from the BIS,18
and they almost uniformly only cover the post-WWII period. Only for Argentina, I
was able to extend the loans series back to 1863 based on the data featured in Ferreres
(2005).19 Data on broad money, nominal GDP, the price level, and the monetary base
are all from either national central banks’ websites and statistical publications, or
from national statistical agencies’ websites.
As for the sample periods, for each country I consider the longest available sample,
with the single exception that, when working with the multipliers, for the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Euro area–whose monetary policies following
the financial crisis have led to dramatic expansions in the monetary base–I end the
sample period in 2007. The reason for doing so is that including the subsequent period
would distort the inference, since the explosion in the monetary base mechanically
caused a simultaneous collapse in the two multipliers, thus artificially ‘blowing up’
the strength of their correlation. On the other hand, for Japan I do not exclude the
period of quantitative easing (QE) which started in early 2001, since the expansion
in the monetary base was manifestly much more gradual. Also, since within the
European Monetary Union (EMU) the monetary base for individual countries is not
defined, when I work with money multipliers I necessarily end the samples for these
countries in 1998 (at the latest).
Whereas for the countries in JST’s dataset the sample periods typically start in
1870,20 and for Argentina it starts in 1863, for several countries in the broader dataset
the samples are quite short. This is the case, e.g., for Brazil, Colombia, and Russia,
for which they start around the mid-1990s, whereas for China the sample starts in
al. (2018). My main findings–in particular, the strong correlation betweeen broad money and
credit–were qualitatively the same. (These results are available upon request.)
17For Denmark, a series for the monetary base cannot literally be computed due to the lack of
data on commercial banks’ reserves. I wish to thank Kim Abildgren, of the Danish central bank,
for confirming this to me.
18See at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm
19Over the period of overlapping (1941-2004) the series from the BIS dataset is near-identical to
that from Ferreres (2005).
20I say ‘typically’ because, in a few cases, data for the monetary base start much later–e.g., for
Australia in 1976–thus compelling me to use shorter samples when working with the multipliers.
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1990. In what follows, all econometric work for the broader dataset will be based
on countries whose samples start at least in 1995 (or, when I use frequency-domain
methods, even before that), whereas I will use the countries with shorter samples
only for ‘plotting’ purposes, i.e. to visually illustrate the joint dynamics of the two
multipliers over the most recent years. Although the samples starting after 1995 are,
in fact, quite short, for this paper’s purposes the evidence they provide is invaluable,
because they clearly show that–contrary to ST’s claim of a disconnect between broad
money and credit after WWII–in countries such as the Czech Republic, the Euro
area, Hungary, and Poland, fluctuations in the two aggregates have proceeded in
lockstep even in recent years.
For West Germany I restrict the sample to 1960-1989. The reason is discussed in
detail in the Online Appendix A.12.2 of Benati, Lucas, Nicolini, and Weber (2018),
and it is summarized in the online data Appendix A to the present paper.21 As for
Switzerland, since, as discussed in the online data Appendix A, the two series for the
monetary base for the periods 1907-1950 and 1950-2006 cannot be linked (because
they are slightly different in 1950), I consider the two periods separately.
I now turn to the evidence.
3 Evidence
In building up my argument that, since the second half of the XIX century, fluc-
tuations in broad money have exhibited an extraordinarily strong correlation with
fluctuations in the total amount of loans granted by the traditional banking sector,
I start from the simplest kind of evidence–the raw data–and I then move to pro-
gressively more sophisticated methods: the country-and-year fixed-effects regressions
used by ST; frequency-domain techniques; and cointegration tests.
3.1 A look at the raw data
3.1.1 The evolution of money and credit multipliers within individual
countries
Figures 1-1, and Figures A.1-A.1 in the online Appendix, show the joint evolution
of the two aggregates’ multipliers, and of their growth rates, respectively, for each
of the 36 countries in the dataset. Since the evidence in the two sets of figures is
qualitatively the same, in what follows I exclusively focus on the multipliers.
The evidence in Figures 1-1 clearly points towards a remarkably strong, and
almost uniformly stable correlation between fluctuations in the two multipliers since
the second half of the XIX century. In particular, contrary to ST’s claim about a
progressive disconnect between broad money and credit since the end of WWII, it is
21In short, the data before 1960 did not include West Berlin and the Saarland, which, in 1960,
jointly accounted for about 6 per cent of overall GDP.
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manifestly apparent how, even after 1945, the ‘production’ of the two aggregates for
a given ‘input’ of base money has systematically proceeded in lockstep, especially at
the very low frequencies.
Rather than discussing in detail the strength and stability of the correlation for
individual countries, it is worth mentioning the few cases in which the two multipliers
either temporarily diverge, or exhibit a somehow weak correlation. Two interesting
examples of the former are provided by France and Italy during the Great Inflation
episode. Whereas, for either country, the two multipliers have evolved in lockstep
over the entire rest of the sample, in both cases the Great Inflation has been char-
acterized by a temporary, sizeable increase in the money multiplier compared to the
credit multiplier. Although I have no explanation for such temporary divergence,
the similarity between the two episodes, for two countries which had similar overall
macroeconomic experiences during those years, naturally suggests that they might
have been driven by the same mechanism. By the same token, an interesting feature
common to both Argentina and Canada is that the two multipliers’ fluctuations have
been more strongly correlated after WWI than before, with the correlation becoming
remarkably strong after WWII: this is exactly the opposite of ST’s claim about the
disconnect between money and credit since WWII. For Thailand the credit multiplier
exhibits a large transitory increase, compared to the money multiplier, around the
time of the 1997 Asian crisis. The same holds for Sweden around the time of the
financial crisis of the early 1990s, and for the United States during the years leading
up to the recent financial crisis. By the same token, Singapore exhibits a short-lived
deviation between the two multipliers around the time of the recent financial crisis.
Greece and Poland exhibit transitory deviations between the multipliers between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, and during the years leading up to the financial crisis,
respectively, for which I have no explanation. Finally, the Netherlands is the only
country for which divergences between the two multipliers appear to have been quite
frequent, and long-lasting. From a close analysis of the evidence in Figure 1 it is
however quite apparent how this is partly an illusion originating from the sizeable
fall in the loans multiplier, compared to the money multiplier, during WWII. In fact,
analyzing separately the two sub-samples before and after WWII, the correlation
between the multipliers appears quite strong in both of them.
Summing up The evidence in Figures 1-1 shows that, since the second half
of the XIX century, fluctuations in the multipliers of broad money and credit have
consistently exhibited a very strong correlation within each of the 36 countries I
analyze. It is important to stress that
() by no means the correlation between the two multipliers appears to have
weakened after WWII: rather, in several cases–notably, Argentina and Canada–
it appears to have become stronger.
() This stylized fact has consistently held for both the advanced countries fea-
tured in JST’s dataset, and comparatively less developed countries such Argentina,
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Figure 2  Average rates of growth of broad money and total loans, and average  
             changes in the multipliers, since the Gold Standard era (all countries) 
 
 
Brazil, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Russia, and China.22
() By the same token, the strength of the correlation has held equally for low-
inflation countries such as Germany, Japan, and Switzerland; for countries which
experienced sizeable inflation fluctuations during the Great Inflation episode, such as
(e.g.) the United Kingdom; and for very high-inflation countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Israel.
I now turn to cross-section evidence.
3.1.2 Average growth rates, and average changes in the multipliers, within
the countries’ cross-section
Figure 2 shows scatterplots of either the average annual growth rates of broad money
and total loans, or the average annual changes in the two aggregates’ multipliers,23
based on the broader dataset.24 In the top row I label with different colors the
observations pertaining to the two periods before and after WWI, whereas in the
bottom row I do the same for the periods before and after WWII. The scatterplots
for the growth rates exclude Argentina, for which the rates of growth of both money
and credit have been so large, after WWI, that including it would make the figures
difficult to read.25
In line with the time-series evidence in Figures 1-1, the cross-section evidence in
Figure 2 provides no support to the notion that the relationship between broad money
and credit may have changed, and become weaker, after WWII. On the contrary,
based on either the changes in the multipliers, or the rates of growth, the relationship
between the two aggregates appears to have been broadly similar during either period.
The key distinguishing feature of the post-WWII era, compared to the pre-WWII
period, simply appears to have been that, after WWII, both money and credit have
been increasing at a substantially faster pace, whereas the relationship between them
appears to have remained essentially unchanged.
At first sight, this would appear to contradict ST’s figures. In discussing the
statistics reported in their Table I (p. 1034) for the pre- and post-WWII periods, ST
(p. 1033) state that:
‘[...] it is clear that annual growth rates of broad money (3.65 percent), loans
(4.16 percent), and assets (4.33 percent) were fairly similar in the pre-WW2
22Which was significantly less developed in the early part of the sample.
23For countries for which the data are available at the quarterly frequency, annual growth rates,
and annual changes in the multipliers, have been computed after converting the data to the annual
frequency by taking averages within the year.
24Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows the corresponding evidence for the countries in JST’s
dataset, which is qualitatively the same as that in Figure 2.
25Argentina’s average annual growth rates of broad money and credit have been equal to 98.1 and
124.2 per cent since WWI, and to 133.4 and 170.2 per cent since WWII. In fact, the observations
for Argentina are exactly in line with those for the other countries (this evidence is available upon
request), so that this country is nothing but an extreme example of the general pattern.
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period; in contrast, after WW2 average broad money growth (8.57 percent)
was much smaller than loan growth (10.94 percent) and asset growth (10.48
percent).’
In fact, these numbers are in line with the evidence reported in my Figure 2,
as the ratios between the rates of growth of loans and broad money for the two
periods–being equal to 4.16/3.65=1.14 and 10.94/8.57=1.28, respectively–are not
substantially different. So, even based on ST’s own numbers, there does not seem to
have been any material difference in the relationship between the rates of growth of
the two aggregates before and after WWII.
Table 1 Estimated slopes from cross-country LAD regressions, and
90 per cent bootstrapped confidence intervals (all countries)
Before WWI After WWI
Based on the rates of growth 1.048 [-0.282; 1.410] 1.030 [0.841; 1.295]
Based on the changes in the multipliers 0.755 [0.523; 0.959] 0.622 [0.525; 0.732]
Before WWII After WWII
Based on the rates of growth 1.018 [0.627; 1.608] 1.291 [0.688; 1.300]
Based on the changes in the multipliers 0.486 [0.243; 0.991] 0.621 [0.504; 0.691]
Evidence from LAD regressions In order to go beyond the simple visual im-
pression, Table 1 reports results from Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) regressions
based on the data shown in Figure 2.26 Specifically, the table reports, for each of the
four periods, the LAD estimate of the slope coefficient in the regression of average
loans growth (the average change in the loans multiplier) on a constant and aver-
age broad money growth (the average change in the broad money multiplier). The
90 per cent coverage confidence intervals have been computed via resampling tech-
niques.27With reference to the main comparison between the two periods before and
after WWII, two facts emerge from the table. First, based on either the growth rates,
26Table A.1 in the online appendix reports the corresponding results for JST’s dataset, which are
qualitatively the same as those in Table 1.
27Resampling is performed as follows. Consider the cross-country LAD regression of  =
[1 2   ]
0 on a constant and  = [12  ]0, where  is the number of countries;  is
either average credit growth, or the average change in the credit multiplier, for country ; and 
is either average broad money growth, or the average change in the money multiplier for country
. Having obtained the simple estimate of the slope coefficient, ̂, I characterize uncertainty
around it as follows. For  = 1, 2, ...,  (with  = 10,000), I randomly draw  indices  from
a uniform distribution defined over the integer domain [1, 2, ...,  ]0, thus building up, for each ,
bootstrapped samples (). Based on each bootstrapped sample () I then perform the
same LAD regression I performed based on the actual data (i.e.  and ), thus building up the
bootstrapped distribution of the LAD regression coefficients. Finally, I rescale the bootstrapped
distribution of the slope coefficient in such a way that its median is equal to the simple estimate,
̂, and I use it to compute the 90 per cent confidence interval reported in Table 1.
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or the changes in the multipliers, the simple estimates point towards an increase in
the slope after WWII, from 1.02 to 1.29 based on the rates of growth, and from 0.49
to 0.62 based on the multipliers. Second, the extent of uncertainty is however such
that neither change is statistically significant: this is clearly shown by the fact that
the 90 per cent confidence intervals for the post-WWII period lie strictly inside the
corresponding confidence intervals for the pre-WWII period.
I now turn to evidence based on the methodology used by ST.
3.2 Evidence from country-and-year fixed-effects regressions
The first panel of Figure 3 shows, for each country in the broader dataset, the ra-
tio between loans and broad money since the Gold Standard era, whereas the first
two panels of Figure 4 show the multipliers of broad money and credit, respectively.
The three panels highlight a dramatic extent of cross-country heterogeneity in the
evolution of both the ratio between the two aggregates, and either of the two multipli-
ers, since the XIX century. By performing country-and-year fixed-effects regressions
based on the data in the first panel of Figure 1,28 ST extracted the year-specific ef-
fects reported as the dark line in their Figure 2, showing a continuous increase, since
WWII, in the average ratio between credit and broad money.
3.2.1 Replicating Schularick and Taylor (2012)
The second panel of Figure 3 replicates the just-mentioned evidence in ST’s Figure
2 based on either of the two datasets considered herein. The methodology I use is
identical to that used by ST:29 the only difference is that whereas ST perform the
regressions based on the logarithms of the ratios between loans and broad money, I
perform it based on the levels. Based on either dataset, the evolution of the estimated
year effects in Figure 3 closely replicates the evidence in ST’s Figure 2: the year effects
exhibit a dramatic collapse between the onset of the Great Depression and the end
of WWII; rebound strongly during subsequent years, reaching the previous peaks
immediately before the collapse of Bretton Woods; and have significantly increased
since then, reaching historically unprecedented levels in the most recent years.
28To be precise, based on a previous version of the dataset, featuring only fourteen countries, and
slightly shorter sample periods.
29ST (p. 1034): ‘[W]e show the mean of the predicted time effects from fixed country-and-year
effects regressions for the dependent variable of interest. That is, for any variable  it we estimate
the fixed effects regression  = + +  and then plot the estimated year effects  to show the
average global level of  in year .’
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Figure 3  Replicating Schularick and Taylor (2012): Ratios between total loans and broad money, 
             and estimated year effects from country- and year- fixed-effects regressions (1870-2013) 
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Figure 4  Multipliers of total loans and broad money, and estimated year effects 
             from country- and year- fixed-effects regressions (1870-2013) 
 
3.2.2 Evidence for multipliers, rates of growth, and ratios between either
broad money or credit and nominal GDP
The third and fourth panels of Figure 4 show the estimated year effects from the
very same country-and-year fixed-effects regressions performed both by ST, and in
the previous subsection, but this time for the multipliers of either total loans of broad
money.30 Consistent with the evidence in Figures 1-1 and Figure 2, based on either
JST’s or the broader dataset the estimated year effects for the two multipliers have
consistently exhibited a remarkably strong correlation over the entire sample, to the
point that, over the entire period since WWI, they have been essentially indistin-
guishable.31 This evidence provides a clear illustration of how, over the entire period
since the XIX century, the creation of broad money and credit, starting from a given
input of base money, has consistently proceeded in lockstep.
The first two panels of Figure 5 present the corresponding evidence for the annual
growth rates of either loans or broad money. In order to better highlight the strength
of the correlation, I present results for 5-year rolling averages of the estimated year
effects. Evidence is qualitatively the same as that based on the multipliers, and I will
therefore not discuss it in detail.
Rather, it is of interest to devote a few words to the evidence shown in the last
two panels of Figure 5, which plot the year effects from country-and-year fixed-effects
regressions for the ratios between either broad money, or total loans, and nominal
GDP.32 Based on the countries in JST’s dataset, the two ratios had been moving in
lockstep between 1870 and the outbreak of WWI. They then significantly diverged
during the following six decades, with the ratio for loans first collapsing, reaching a
trough around the end of WWII, and then rebounding strongly during subsequent
years; and the ratio for money displaying sizeable fluctuations around the level it
had reached around WWI. By the time of the collapse of Bretton Woods, the rela-
tionship between the two ratios which had characterized the pre-WWI era had fully
re-established itself, and during subsequent years the two ratios kept increasing in
synch, to the point that, if they had not been shown with different colors, it would be
difficult to tell them apart. This evidence illustrates how, in terms of the relationship
between the ratios between either broad money or credit and nominal GDP, there
is no difference between the pre-WWI era, and the period following the collapse of
Bretton Woods. As the last panel of Figure 5 shows, during either period the two
ratios had, and have been moving in lockstep. This provides a further illustration of
the fact that ST’s claim of a disconnect between broad money and credit since WWII
is incorrect. Finally, evidence based on the broader dataset is in line with that based
30Once again, for all countries for which the data are available at the quarterly frequency, I
preliminarly convert them to the annual frequency by taking annual averages.
31Quite obviously, once appropriately rescaled: notice that in either panel the left hand-side and
right hand-side scales are different.
32As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the latter ratio is interpreted by Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor
(2017) as a measure of aggregate financial leverage for the whole economy.
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Figure 5  Estimated year effects from country- and year- fixed-effects regressions (1870-2013) 
 
Table 2 Fractions of frequency-0 variance of the first-differences of the multipliers of broad
money and of total loans explained by the most powerful common shock, based on the lon-
gest continuous available samples
First difference of:
broad money multiplier total loans multiplier
90%-coverage 90%-coverage
Mode Median confidence interval Mode Median confidence interval
Argentina (1905-2014) 0.990 0.983 [0.064; 0.997] 0.990 0.983 [0.066; 0.997]
Australia (1976-2013) 0.990 0.964 [0.128; 0.996] 0.990 0.964 [0.100; 0.996]
Canada (1874-2013) 0.990 0.991 [0.116; 0.999] 0.990 0.993 [0.141; 0.999]
Chile (1986-2016) 0.990 0.970 [0.109; 0.997] 0.990 0.974 [0.125; 0.997]
China (1990Q1-2017Q3) 0.990 0.968 [0.052; 0.996] 0.990 0.968 [0.053; 0.996]
Finland (1870-1985) 0.990 0.992 [0.081; 0.999] 0.990 0.992 [0.082; 0.999]
France (1946-1994) 0.929 0.692 [0.053; 0.957] 0.939 0.714 [0.049; 0.959]
West Germany (1960-1989) 0.990 0.963 [0.045; 0.997] 0.990 0.963 [0.043; 0.997]
India (1951-2015) 0.990 0.970 [0.135; 0.996] 0.980 0.970 [0.125; 0.996]
Italy (1870-1997) 0.980 0.939 [0.091; 0.993] 0.980 0.943 [0.098; 0.994]
Japan (1874-2013) 0.990 0.973 [0.063; 0.997] 0.990 0.973 [0.063; 0.997]
Malaysia (1975-2016) 0.990 0.987 [0.098; 0.998] 0.990 0.987 [0.100; 0.998]
Netherlands (1945-1992) 0.929 0.741 [0.134; 0.967] 0.929 0.796 [0.170; 0.972]
New Zealand (1960-2003) 0.990 0.979 [0.084; 0.998] 0.990 0.979 [0.084; 0.998]
Norway (1870-2013) 0.990 0.986 [0.077; 0.999] 0.990 0.986 [0.080; 0.999]
Portugal (1920-1998) 0.990 0.906 [0.039; 0.994] 0.990 0.908 [0.042; 0.994]
Singapore (1991Q1-2017Q3) 0.990 0.820 [0.091; 0.991] 0.990 0.803 [0.093; 0.988]
South Africa (1965-2016) 0.980 0.919 [0.030; 0.990] 0.980 0.921 [0.031; 0.991]
South Korea (1971-2015) 0.990 0.982 [0.052; 0.998] 0.990 0.982 [0.051; 0.998]
Spain (1946-1997) 0.990 0.984 [0.044; 0.998] 0.990 0.985 [0.045; 0.998]
Sweden (1871-2013) 0.990 0.992 [0.143; 0.999] 0.990 0.992 [0.143; 0.999]
Switzerland (1950-2006) 0.990 0.994 [0.162; 0.999] 0.990 0.994 [0.166; 0.999]
Thailand (1976-2016) 0.990 0.964 [0.257; 0.997] 0.990 0.968 [0.253; 0.997]
United Kingdom (1880-2007) 0.990 0.994 [0.683; 0.999] 0.990 0.994 [0.753; 0.999]
United States (1880-2007) 0.990 0.965 [0.023; 0.998] 0.990 0.965 [0.022; 0.998]
 Spectral bootstrapping has been implemented via Berkowitz and Diebold’s (1998) procedure.
on JST’s, being just slightly less stark.
I now turn to evidence from cross-spectral methods, which allow to properly char-
acterize the strength of the relationship at the low frequencies.
3.3 Evidence based on the most powerful common shock at
the frequency =0
In Section 3.4 I will show that either Shin’s (1994) or Wright’s (2000) test detects
cointegration between the multipliers of broad money and total loans. In this section
I discuss conceptually related evidence based on a more flexible approach requiring
less stringent assumptions.33
Table 2 reports, for the longest continuous sample which is available for each
country, the fractions of frequency-0 variance of the first-differences34 of the mul-
tipliers of broad money and total loans which are explained by the most powerful
common shock–to be defined in the next sub-section–whereas Tables 3-3 report
the same type of evidence for the pre- and post-WWII periods. The spectral density
matrix of the data has been estimated based on the fast-Fourier transform (FFT).
Smoothing of the periodograms and cross-periodograms has been implemented in the
frequency domain based on a Bartlett spectral window, with the spectral bandwidth
being selected automatically based on the algorithm proposed by Beltrao and Bloom-
field (1987). Finally, spectral bootstrapping has been implemented via the procedure
proposed by Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), which is a multivatiate generalization of
the univariate procedure introduced by Franke and Hardle (1992).
3.3.1 Extracting the most powerful common shock at =0
The best way to illustrate the approach used herein is to highlight similarities and
differences with identification based on long-run restrictions within a structural VAR
context, as in (e.g.) Blanchard and Quah (1989). Within this context, a researcher
starts by estimating a VAR(),  = 0 + 1−1 + ... + − + , with [0] =
Ω, for the series of interest, thus obtaining (e.g., OLS) estimates for the relevant
objects, ̂,  = 0, 1, 2, ..., , and Ω̂. Based on these, (s)he computes the estimate
of the spectral density matrix of  at the frequency =0 as ̂(0) = ̂Ω̂̂
0, where ̂
= [ − ̂(1)]−1, where  is the  ×  identity matrix, and ̂(1) = 1 + 2 +
... + . Finally, the researcher factors ̂(0) as ̂(0) =  ×  0, where  is
33Online Appendix B reports additional results based on spectral analysis, pertaining to the cross-
spectral coherence and gain between the first differences of the multipliers of broad money and total
loans at the very low frequencies. These results are conceptually in line with the evidence reported
in this section, and they are therefore not reported or discussed here.
34I consider the first differences, rather than the levels, of the multipliers because spectral analysis
is predicated on the assumption of stationarity, whereas–as I discuss in Section 3.4.1–the null
of a unit root cannot be rejected for any multiplier and any country, with the single exception of
Argentina for the period since the early XX century.
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the matrix of the structural shocks’s long-run impacts, featuring zeros in the relevant
positions. There are two differences between this approach and what I am doing here:
() rather than extracting ̂(0) from a VAR estimated in the time-domain, I
estimate it directly in the frequency domain, based on the FFT of the data. The
key advantage of doing this is that I do not have to take a stand on the presence,
or absence of cointegration between the two multipliers, as the FFT-based estimator
works equally well in both cases.35
() The shock I identify maximizes the conditional cross-spectrum36–i.e., the
cross-spectrum computed only conditional on this shock–between the first differences
of the two multipliers at =0, which is the natural measure of the strength of the
co-movement between the two variables in the infinite long-run.37
3.3.2 Evidence
Table 2 reports, for the first difference of either multiplier, the mode, median, and 5th
and 95th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of the fraction of frequency-0
variance of the series explained by the just-defined most powerful common shock.
Once again, the evidence speaks for itself, with (e.g.) the modal estimate being equal
to 0.99 for the first differences of either multiplier for nearly all countries, with the
exceptions of France (0.929 and 0.939), Italy and South Africa (in both cases, 0.98
for both multipliers), and the Nertherlands (0.929 for either multiplier). Both the
median estimates, and the confidence intervals, exhibit somehow more heterogeneity,
but the main message from Table 2 is very clear: the shock which maximizes the
frequency-0 covariation between the first differences of the two multipliers explains
very large fractions of the variance of both series at =0.
In order to understand the implications of this result, it is important to recall that
if the two multipliers were cointegrated, the shock I am identifying would explain, by
definition, 100 per cent of the variance of both series at =0. This is the reason why,
35In the presence of cointegration, (0) will be reduced-rank, but that’s all.
36Let 12() be the (1,2) element of the spectral density matrix of the first differences of the two
multipliers at the frequency . The cross-spectrum is defined as [Co()2 + Qu(0)2]12, where Co()
and Qu() are the real and the imaginary parts, respectively, of 12().
37From a technical point of view, identification of the shock is straightforward. Starting from an
initial factorization of ̂(0) as ̂(0) =  × 0, where, e.g.,  is the Cholesky factor of
̂(0), identification boils down to finding a rotation angle  such that the rotation matrix
 =
∙
cos() sin()
-sin() cos()
¸
produces a new factorization ̂(0) = ×0, with  = ×, which maximizes the cross-spectrum
conditional on the first shock, i.e. the cross-spectrum for
̂1(0) = ×
∙
1 0
0 0
¸
× 0
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Table 3a Fractions of frequency-0 variance of the first-differences of the multipliers of broad money
and of total loans explained by the most powerful common shock, based on the longest continuous
available samples
Fraction of random draws
First difference of broad money multiplier: from the two distributions
Before WWII After WWII for which the fraction
90%-coverage 90%-coverage after WWII is smaller
Mode Median confidence interval Mode Median confidence interval than before WWII:
Argentina 0.980 0.942 [0.043; 0.991] 0.980 0.948 [0.056; 0.992] 0.476
Canada 0.990 0.981 [0.267; 0.997] 0.990 0.971 [0.063; 0.997] 0.584
Finland 0.990 0.959 [0.020; 0.997] 0.970 0.912 [0.043; 0.987] 0.639
Germany 0.990 0.996 [0.916; 0.999] 0.990 0.963 [0.053; 0.997] 0.844
Italy 0.980 0.964 [0.015; 0.995] 0.980 0.866 [0.090; 0.987] 0.709
Japan 0.939 0.859 [0.425; 0.979] 0.990 0.988 [0.111; 0.999] 0.163
Netherlands 0.980 0.887 [0.113; 0.989] 0.950 0.748 [0.131; 0.970] 0.650
Norway 0.990 0.991 [0.074; 0.999] 0.990 0.967 [0.067; 0.996] 0.737
Portugal 0.626 0.564 [0.100; 0.912] 0.980 0.902 [0.051; 0.989] 0.211
Spain 0.970 0.828 [0.067; 0.989] 0.990 0.984 [0.045; 0.998] 0.183
Sweden 0.980 0.924 [0.039; 0.992] 0.980 0.940 [0.056; 0.995] 0.464
Switzerland 0.990 0.989 [0.086; 0.999] 0.990 0.994 [0.216; 0.999] 0.400
United Kingdom 0.980 0.940 [0.081; 0.994] 0.990 0.984 [0.076; 0.998] 0.294
United States 0.990 0.998 [0.885; 0.999] 0.990 0.995 [0.143; 0.999] 0.669
 Spectral bootstrapping has been implemented via Berkowitz and Diebold’s (1998) procedure.
Table 3b Fractions of frequency-0 variance of the first-differences of the multipliers of broad money
and of total loans explained by the most powerful common shock, based on the longest continuous
available samples
Fraction of random draws
First difference of total loans multiplier: from the two distributions
Before WWII After WWII for which the fraction
90%-coverage 90%-coverage after WWII is smaller
Mode Median confidence interval Mode Median confidence interval than before WWII:
Argentina 0.980 0.943 [0.043; 0.991] 0.980 0.948 [0.057; 0.992] 0.479
Canada 0.990 0.980 [0.227; 0.997] 0.990 0.974 [0.069; 0.997] 0.569
Finland 0.990 0.959 [0.021; 0.997] 0.970 0.912 [0.041; 0.987] 0.639
Germany 0.990 0.996 [0.936; 0.999] 0.990 0.963 [0.052; 0.997] 0.851
Italy 0.980 0.964 [0.016; 0.995] 0.980 0.866 [0.089; 0.987] 0.713
Japan 0.990 0.859 [0.368; 0.989] 0.990 0.988 [0.109; 0.999] 0.184
Netherlands 0.980 0.938 [0.165; 0.994] 0.889 0.748 [0.136; 0.964] 0.749
Norway 0.990 0.991 [0.074; 0.999] 0.980 0.967 [0.065; 0.996] 0.739
Portugal 0.737 0.777 [0.141; 0.967] 0.980 0.902 [0.053; 0.989] 0.326
Spain 0.970 0.812 [0.065; 0.983] 0.990 0.985 [0.046; 0.998] 0.164
Sweden 0.980 0.940 [0.050; 0.993] 0.980 0.942 [0.054; 0.994] 0.499
Switzerland 0.990 0.989 [0.087; 0.999] 0.990 0.994 [0.219; 0.999] 0.406
United Kingdom 0.980 0.941 [0.083; 0.994] 0.990 0.984 [0.077; 0.998] 0.294
United States 0.990 0.998 [0.910; 0.999] 0.990 0.995 [0.143; 0.999] 0.672
 Spectral bootstrapping has been implemented via Berkowitz and Diebold’s (1998) procedure.
as I mentioned, the present approach is conceptually related to cointegration, but it
is also more flexible. The bottom line from Table 2 is that, even if the two multipliers
ultimately turned out not to be, strictly speaking, cointegrated, nonetheless their
relationship is, in fact, remarkably close to that between cointegrated processes.38 In
fact, a key result in Table 2 is that, for each single country, the estimated fractions
of variance at =0 for the two multipliers are virtually identical (as just mentioned,
if the series were cointegrated, their fractions of variance at =0 explained by the
common shock would be both equal to 100 per cent).
Tables 3-3 report the same evidence as in Table 2, but for pre- and post-WWII
periods. In either table, the very last column reports the probability that a random
draw from the distribution of the fraction of variance at =0 explained by the most
powerful common shock for the post-WWII period is smaller than a random draw
from the corresponding distribution for the pre-WWII period. I will not comment on
the results in detail, but what ought to be stressed is that, once again, even through
the lenses of this approach, there is no evidence whatsoever that the correlation
between the two multipliers may have weakened after WWII.
I now turn to the results from cointegration analysis.
3.4 Evidence from cointegration methods
Tables A.4-A5 in the online appendix report bootstrapped p-values39 for Elliot
et al. (1996) unit root tests for the multipliers of broad money and credit, either
with or without a time trend, and for either the longest available sample, or the
two sub-samples before and after WWII. With one single exception–Argentina since
1905–the null hypothesis of a unit root is never rejected for either multiplier.
Tables 4 and 5 report, for the longest available sample, and for the two sub-
samples before and after WWII, respectively, bootstrapped p-values for Shin’s (1994)
tests of the null of cointegration between the two multipliers; and, based on Wright’s
(2000) test, the 90 per cent coverage bootstrapped confidence interval for , the
second element of the normalized candidate cointegration vector [1 -]0. Wright’s
test searches across the parameter space for all of the values of  for which the null
hypothesis of stationarity of the candidate cointegration residual  − –where
 and  are the multipliers of broad money and loans–cannot be rejected. The
advantage of Wright’s test over Shin’s is that it is valid under more general conditions,
in particular, when the series under investigation are not I(1), but rather local-to-
38To put it differently, the size of the unit root component which is not common to the two
multipliers is very small.
39-values have been computed by bootstrapping 10,000 times estimated ARIMA(,1,0) processes.
In all cases, the bootstrapped processes are of length equal to the series under investigation. As for
the lag order, , since, as it is well known, results from unit root tests may be sensitive to the specific
lag order which is being used, for reasons of robustness I consider two alternative lag orders, either
1 or 2 (with annual data), or 4 and 8 (with quarterly data).
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unity (see the discussion in Wright (2000)).40 I bootstrap both tests as in Cavaliere
et al. (2012), based on the VECM estimated conditional on one cointegration vector.
Table 4 Testing for cointegration based on the longest
available samples
Shin’s tests Wright’s tests
bootstrapped 90% confidence
Country Period p-values interval for ̂
Argentina 1863-1891 0.225 [-0.438; 0.932]
Australia 1976-2013 0.489 [0.354; 0.639]
Canada 1874-2013 0.035 [-0.421; 1.580]
Chile 1986-2016 0.717 [-0.364; 1.637]
China 1990Q1-2017Q3 0.078 [1.197; 2.647]
Finland 1870-1985 0.856 [0.777; 1.082]
France 1946-1994 0.944 [0.310; 1.705]
Germany 1883-1913 0.051 [0.524; 1.139]
1960-1989 0.705 [0.252; 0.642]
India 1951-2015 0.094 [1.138; 1.868]
Italy 1870-1997 0.892 [0.675; 1.865]
Japan 1874-2013 0.325 [0.873; 2.048]
Malaysia 1975-2016 0.295 [0.724; 1.429]
Netherlands 1946-1992 0.336 [0.443; 0.803]
New Zealand 1960-2003 0.977 [0.549; 0.644]
Norway 1870-2013 0.037 [-0.481; 1.519]
Portugal 1870-1903 0.143 [0.426; 1.726]
1920-1998 0.629 [0.979; 1.544;]
Singapore 1991Q1-2017Q3 0.407 [-0.653; 1.347]
South Africa 1965-2016 0.315 [0.519; 0.864]
South Korea 1971-2015 0.416 [0.919; 2.119]
Spain 1900-1935 0.816 [2.476; 4.461]
1946-1997 0.160 [1.033; 1.183]
Sweden 1871-2012 0.302 [-0.626; 1.374]
Switzerland 1907-1950 0.384 [0.280; 0.495]
1950-2006 0.164 [0.618; 0.803]
Thailand 1976-2016 0.023 [0.529; 1.639]
United Kingdom 1880-2007 0.023 [0.725; 0.805]
United States 1880-2007 0.111 [-0.291; 1.710]
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. For details, see text.
40The test exploits the duality between testing and the construction of confidence intervals, so
that the confidence interval for  at a given significance level is simply the set of all values of  for
which stationarity of  −  cannot be rejected.
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Table 5 Testing for cointegration by sub-samples
Shin’s tests Wright’s tests
90 per cent
confidence
Country Period p-values interval for ̂
Post-WWI
Argentina 1920-2014 0.566 [-0.013; 1.987]
Canada 1920-2013 0.749 [0.453; 0.623]
Finland 1920-1985 0.742 [0.734; 1.189]
Italy 1920-1997 0.691 [0.155; 2.155]
Japan 1920-2013 0.400 [-0.136; 1.864]
Norway 1920-2013 0.246 [0.075; 0.505]
Portugal 1920-1998 0.636 [0.979; 1.544]
Sweden 1920-2012 0.083 [-0.679; 1.321]
United Kingdom 1920-2007 0.769 [0.697; 0.787]
United States 1920-2007 0.353 [-0.374; 1.626]
Post-WWII
Argentina 1946-2014 0.183 [0.860; 2.045]
Canada 1946-2013 0.594 [0.531; 0.646]
Finland 1946-1985 0.435 [0.762; 1.047]
Italy 1946-1997 0.166 [0.139; 2.139]
Japan 1946-2013 0.042 [-0.099; 1.901]
Norway 1946-2013 0.079 [0.442; 0.522]
Portugal 1946-1998 0.298 [0.913; 2.118]
Sweden 1946-2012 0.279 [-0.732; 1.268]
United Kingdom 1946-2007 0.943 [0.686; 0.796]
United States 1946-2007 0.030 [-0.369; 1.631]
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications. For details, see text.
Two main results emerge from the tables:
() Wright’s test detects cointegration for all countries and all periods; and
() based on Shin’s test, the null of cointegration is rejected, at the 10 per cent
level, only in a handful of cases. Based on the full sample, this is the case for
Canada, India, Norway, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Whereas, e.g., rejection
for Canada can be rationalized in the light of the evolution of the two multipliers in
the XIX century’s portion of the sample (see Figure 1), other rejections are puzzling:
this is the case, in particular, for the United Kingdom, for which, as shown in Figure
1, the two multipliers have been moving in synch over the entire period since 1880.
A simple way to rationalize this, and similar rejections of the null is in terms of the
‘luck of the draw’: even if cointegration were there in all samples, due to the very
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nature of statistical tests, a certain number of rejections should always be expected.41
Overall, I take the evidence from Tables 4 and 5 as providing additional, strong
confirmation of this paper’s main thesis. I now turn to analyze in more detail an
issue I briefly mentioned in the Introduction: the evolution of the ratio between loans
and broad money is uniformative for the issue of whether there is, or is not, a stable
relationship between the two aggregates.
4 Why Is the Evolution of the Ratio Between Credit
and Broad Money Uninformative?
Consider a panel of countries, and assume that, for each individual country  = 1, 2,
3, ...,  , the logarithm of the multiplier of broad money follows either a random-walk
with drift,
ln = ln

−1 +  +  (1)
or a process with a deterministic time trend,
ln =  +  ln

−1 + +  (2)
where  ≡ 0, with  and 0 being broad money and the monetary
base for country ; and  being a country-specific shock to 

 , with (e.g.)  ∼
(0 2). In (1)  is a country-specific drift, whereas in (2)  and  and  are
a country-specific intercept, AR coefficient, and time trend, respectively. Since, as
documented in Figure 4, since WWII the multipliers of broad money have been
increasing across the board, I assume that, for all countries , 0 and 0. Finally,
I assume that 01–so that (1) is stationary around a determistic time trend–
whereas  is unrestricted.
Let us then assume, for the sake of the argument, that for each country  the
logarithm of the multiplier of total loans is, up to a stationary stochastic process, a
linear function of the logarithm of the money multiplier,
ln =  +  ln

 +  (3)
where  ≡ 0, with  being total loans, and  being an I(0) process–
e.g., for the sake of the argument,  ∼ (0 2). Since, as documented in Figure 3,
the ratio between loans and broad money has been broadly increasing since WWII, I
assume that 1 for all  = 1, 2, 3, ...,  .
The implication of (3) is that–conceptually in line with the ‘money view’–
conditional on the monetary base, fluctuations in broad money are the only driver of
either permanent or long-horizon fluctuations in bank loans (depending on whether
the specification for the money multiplier is either (1) or (2), respectively).
41In particular, it the test is correctly size,  per cent incorrect rekections at the  per cent level.
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From (3), the logarithm of the ratio between loans and broad money is equal to
[ln − ln ] =  + ( − 1) ln +  (4)
For ST’s country-and-year fixed-effects regression  = ++ based on the panel
of  countries, with  = [ln

− ln ], the theoretical value of the estimate of the
year effect  is equal to
̂ =
1

X
=1
( − 1) ln (5)
which, since 1 for all  = 1, 2, ...,  , exhibits an upward trend originating from
the upward trend (either deterministic, or stochastic) in the broad money multipliers.
This is the result shown by ST in Figure 2 (and in Figure 3 in the present paper)
for the ratios between total loans and broad money. The previous discussion suggests
that this result is not capturing any disconnect between credit and broad money, and
that an interpretation of this evidence along these lines is incorrect.
I finally turn to the predictive power of broad money and credit for financial crises.
5 The Predictive Power of BroadMoney and Credit
for Financial Crises
In Section V (‘Credit Booms and Financial Crises’), ST use both linear and logit
probability models in order to explore whether lagged real credit and real broad money
growth may help to predict financial crises. Their main claim is that, whereas in the
pre-WWII sample credit and money were essentially equally powerful at predicting
crises, in the post-WWII period credit has become significantly more powerful than
broad money, thus lending further support to their main contention that, sinceWWII,
the world economy has entered the ‘Age of Credit’.
In this section I apply ST’s methodology in order to reconsider the entire issue,
based on either of the two datasets considered herein, and paying special attention
to the predicting power of the two multipliers. As anticipated in the Introduction,
my two main results are that after WWII, () changes in the multipliers of either
credit or broad money have been more powerful at predicting financial crises than
real credit growth; and () there has been no change in the relative prediction power
of the two aggregates, compared to the pre-WWII period. Both before, and after
WWII credit had, and has exhibited a greater prediction power than broad money
for financial crisis. However, although after WWII the prediction power of both
aggregates has increased compared to the pre-WWII period, their relative prediction
power has remained unchanged.
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5.1 Methodology
I uniquely focus on ST’s preferred specification, based on the logit probability model;
featuring country-specific dummies but no year-specific dummy; and featuring no
additional regressor beyond five lags of either the rates of growth of real money
or credit, the first differences of the multipliers of the two aggregates, or the first
differences of their ratios with nominal GDP (so, overall I consider six possible sets of
regressors). This is to make my results, and the comparison with ST, as transparent
as possible. For the seventeen countries in JST’s dataset, the dates of the financial
crisis are from the dataset itself,42 whereas for the other countries (as discussed in
the online data Appendix A) they are from either Bordo et al. (2001), Cecchetti et
al. (2009), or Laeven and Valencia (2013).
The dependent variable in the logit specification,  , is a dummy which takes
the value of 1 for the financial crises years, and 0 otherwise. As for the matrix of
regressors, , I consider the just-mentioned six possible specifications. The likelihood
function for the sample is given by
() =
Y
=1
()
[1− ()]1− (6)
where  is the sample size,  is the vector of parameters to be estimated,  = 1
for the financial crises years, and  = 0 otherwise, and () is the probability for
observation , which is a function of the previously mentioned regressors. With
ln
()
1− () = 
0
 ⇒ () =

0

1 + 
0

=
1
1 + −
0

(7)
the log-likelihood is
ln() =
X
1=1
(
0
)−
X
1=1
ln(1 + 
0
) (8)
I maximize (8) numerically via simulated annealing, exactly as in Benati (2008).43
Having found the parameter vector which maximizes the likelihood, ̂, rather
42Specifically, the file JSTcrisisR2.xlsx.
43Specifically, following Goffe et al. (1994), I implement simulated annealing via the algorithm
proposed by Corana et al. (1987), setting the key parameters to 0 =100,000,  = 0.9,  = 5,  =
20,  = 10−6, and  = 4, where 0 is the initial temperature,  is the temperature reduction factor,
 is the number of times the algorithm goes through the  loops before the temperature starts
being reduced,  is the number of times the algorithm goes through the function before adjusting
the step size,  is the convergence (tolerance) criterion, and  is the number of times convergence
is achieved before the algorithm stops. Finally, initial conditions were chosen stochastically by the
algorithm itself, whereas the maximum number of functions evaluations, set to 1,000,000, was never
achieved.
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than relying on asymptotic formulas, I stochastically map the log-likelihood’s surface
via Random-Walk Metropolis (RWM). The only difference between the ‘standard’
RWM algorithm which is routinely used for Bayesian estimation and what I am
doing here is that the ‘jump’ to the new position in the Markov chain is accepted or
rejected based on a rule which does not involve any Bayesian priors, as it uniquely
involves the likelihood of the data. So, to be clear, the proposal draw for , ̃, is
accepted with probability min[1, (−1, ̃ |  , )], and rejected otherwise, where
−1 is the current position in the Markov chain, and
(−1 ̃ | ) =
(̃ | )
(−1 | )
(9)
which uniquely involves the likelihood.44 All other estimation details are identical to
Benati (2008), to which the reader is referred to. I use 1,000,000 draws for the burn-in
period, and 4,000,000 draws for the ergodic distribution, which I ‘thin’ by sampling
every 2,000 draws in order to reduce the draws’ correlation.
Tables A6-A6 in the online Appendix report the fractions of accepted draws–
which are uniformly very close to the 23 per cent ideal acceptance rate in high di-
mensions45–and two statistics for checking the autocorrelation of the draws:46 the
first autocorrelation, and draws’ inefficiency factors.47 The first autocorrelations are
uniformly around 0, whereas the inefficiency factors are typically around one, which
is much lower than the 20-25 value which is typically taken as signalling problems in
convergence.
5.2 Evidence
Figure 6 reports, based on either JST’s or the broader dataset, and for either the
full samples, or the two sub-periods before and after WWII, the distributions of the
same metric used by ST, i.e., the area under the ROC curve (AUROC). In each case
I report results for two sets of regressors, based on either broad money or credit.
44With Bayesian priors it would be
(−1 ̃ | ) =
(̃ | ) (̃)
(−1 | ) (−1)
where  (·) would encodes the priors about .
45See Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995).
46Specifically, for reasons of space, the tables report statistics for the autocorrelation of the draws
for the metric used by ST–i.e., the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve–
rather than for each individual parameter in the vector . Results for the parameters in  are
qualitatively the same, and are available upon request.
47The inefficiency factors are defined as the inverse of the relative numerical efficiency measure of
Geweke (1992),  = (2)−1 1
(0)
R 
− (), where () is the spectral density of the sequence
of draws from RWM for the quantity of interest at the frequency . I estimate the spectral densities
as before, based on the FFT transform.
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Figure 6  Maximum likelihood estimates of the AUROC: distributions of  
             the AUROC’s draws generated via Random-Walk Metropolis 
 
Table 6 Predicting financial crises based on total loans and broad
money: maximum likelihood estimates of the area under the ROC
curve (median, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution
generated via Random-Walk Metropolis)
Difference between
random draws from
the distributions based
Distribution based on: on loans and money:
loans multiplier money multiplier
Only JST’s countries
Before WWII 0.706 [0.670; 0.729] 0.665 [0.626; 0.691] 0.041 [-0.004; 0.087]
After WWII 0.774 [0.718; 0.814] 0.733 [0.678; 0.766] 0.044 [-0.020; 0.113]
All countries
Before WWII 0.701 [0.666; 0.722] 0.661 [0.620; 0.686] 0.040 [-0.001; 0.083]
After WWII 0.788 [0.754; 0.810] 0.755 [0.721; 0.780] 0.033 [-0.009; 0.076]
loans growth money growth
Only JST’s countries
Before WWII 0.695 [0.665; 0.720] 0.678 [0.646; 0.699] 0.018 [-0.020; 0.058]
After WWII 0.647 [0.596; 0.682] 0.621 [0.580; 0.648] 0.026 [-0.033; 0.080]
All countries
Before WWII 0.679 [0.647; 0.702] 0.658 [0.627; 0.681] 0.022 [-0.016; 0.063]
After WWII 0.700 [0.664; 0.727] 0.671 [0.636; 0.695] 0.030 [-0.014; 0.077]
loans over GDP money over GDP
Only JST’s countries
Before WWII 0.680 [0.645; 0.703] 0.633 [0.596; 0.658] 0.047 [0.004; 0.089]
After WWII 0.720 [0.682; 0.749] 0.654 [0.609; 0.685] 0.068 [0.016; 0.118]
All countries
Before WWII 0.674 [0.636; 0.697] 0.630 [0.591; 0.653] 0.045 [0.000; 0.091]
After WWII 0.743 [0.714; 0.766] 0.687 [0.654; 0.712] 0.057 [0.017; 0.097]
Table 6 reports the median, and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distributions
for the two periods before and after WWII. The last column also reports statistics
in line with those in the last column of Table 3-3, in order to better characterize
the comparison between the pre- and post-WWII periods. Specifically, the column
reports the median, and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distributions of the
difference between two random draws from the distributions based on total loans
and on broad money, in order to chacterize how the relative predictive power of
the two aggregates has changed after WWII. So, to be clear, focusing (e.g.) on the
results for the pre-WWII period for JST’s countries based on the two multipliers–
for which the medians of the two distributions based on loans and broad money are
0.706 and 0.665 respectively–the median and the two percentiles reported in the last
column, 0.041 [-0.004; 0.087], pertain to the distribution of the difference between one
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random draw from the distribution based on loans, and one random draw from the
distribution based on money. The fact that the median of this distribution is 0.041
points towards a greater predicting power of the first difference of the multiplier of
total loans, compared to the first difference of the multiplier of broad money, based
JST’s countries before WWII.
In order to properly assess this evidence, it is important to recollect that a perfect
classifier would have an AUROC equal to 1, whereas by tossing a coin we would get
an AUROC of 0.5. The following main results emerge from the evidence in the figure
and the table:
() for the post-WWII period, changes in the multipliers of either loans or broad
money have been more powerful at predicting financial crises than credit growth, the
variable originally studied by ST. In particular, for this period the change in the
multiplier of total loans has clearly been the best predictor across the six I consider.
() Total loans are uniformly more powerful at predicting financial crises than
broad money. So, in spite of the previously documented remarkably strong correlation
between long-run fluctuations in credit and broadmoney over the entire sample period
since the XIX century, credit exhibits a greater short-to-medium-run48 forecasting
power for financial crises than broad money.
() Crucially, however, based on the statistics in the last column of Table 6,
there is no evidence that credit may have become comparatively more powerful at
predicting financial crises, compared to broad money, after WWII. Focusing on the
first differences of the multipliers, the median of the distribution of the difference
between random draws from the two distributions based on loans and on broad money
was equal, based on JST’s countries, to 0.041 before WWII and it has been equal
to 0.044 after WWII, whereas the corresponding figures for the broader dataset are
0.040 and 0.033. Figures for the two inferior predictors–the growth rates, and the
ratios with nominal GDP–are qualitatively the same.
() With the single exception of the evidence considered by ST–i.e., rates of
growth for the sample of JST’s countries–all other evidence in Table 6 points towards
an increase in the predicting power of both credit and broad money since WWII. This
is especially clear for the multipliers, which, e.g. based on JST’s countries, feature
increases in the median estimate of the AUROC from 0.706 to 0.774 for loans, and
from 0.665 to 0.733 for broad money.
So the bottom line is that both before, and after WWII credit had, and has
exhibited a greater prediction power than broad money for financial crises. However,
although after WWII the prediction power of both aggregates has increased compared
to the pre-WWII period, their relative prediction power has remained unchanged.
Once again, there is no evidence that, for the traditional banking sector covered by
either JST’s or the BIS data, the post-WWII period has been in any way different
from the pre-WWII era (other than the just-mentioned increase in the predicting
power for financial crises common to both loans and broad money).
48As mentioned, in line with ST, I am using five lags of the regressors.
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Figure 7  The expansion of the ‘market-based’ banking system in the United States (1946-2007): 
             ratios between the aggregate assets of financial intermediaries and the monetary base 
 
6 The Ascent of Shadow Banking and the Onset
of the Age of Credit
My results demonstrate that ST’s claims that, post-WWII, credit has become dis-
connected from broad money, and more powerful at predicting financial crises, are
incorrect. Drawing, from this evidence, the conclusion that nothing has changed since
the Gold Standard era,49 and in particular since WWII, would however be grossly
incorrect. What has changed is what is not in either JST’s or the BIS data, that
is, the ‘market-based’ banking sector which was largely behind the recent financial
crisis.
To the very best of my knowledge, data for the shadow-banking sector are not
collected either systematically, or with a breadth and extent of detail comparable to
that which pertains to the traditional banking sector. In Figure 7 I therefore report
some simple evidence for the United States, based on annual data from the Financial
Accounts of the United States (Z.1 release) from the Federal Reserve Board’s website.
The figure shows, for the period 1946-2007, the ratios between the aggregate assets
of several financial intermediaries and the monetary base. I end the sample in 2007
for the reason I discussed in Section 2, pertaining to the dramatic increase in the
monetary base since then. The multiplier of total loans is the same series shown as
the red line in the very last panel of Figure 1, and since it pertains to the traditional
banking sector, it provides a benchmark in order to put into perspective the relative
expansion of shadow financial intermediaries compared to traditional banks.
Whereas, as it would be expected based on what we have seen so far, the assets of
traditional banks (here, U.S. chartered depository institutions) closely co-moved with
the multiplier of total loans, the assets of two market-based intermediaries (brokers-
dealers and money-marke funds) literally exploded since the early 1980s, and are now
of the same order of magnitude–and, taken together, even greater–than those of
traditional banks. As shown by Adrian and Shin (2008, 2011), the assets of brokers-
dealers do indeed possess a superior informational content for macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, compared to the assets of traditional banks. This is the true reason why,
today, we live in the ‘Age of Credit’, rather than the one given by ST.
Summing up, the ascent of shadow banking is the only reason why, today, we
live in the ‘Age of Credit’: if it were for the traditional banking sector–for which
the creation of broad money and credit has proceeded in lockstep since the Gold
Standard era–we would still be living in the ‘Age of Money’, and the ‘money view’
would still be perfectly relevant. Another way of saying this is that, contrary to ST’s
position, the fundamental distinction is not between the two periods before and after
WWII, but rather between the traditional and the ‘market-based’ banking sectors:
the former still lives in the ‘Age of Money’, whereas the ascent of the latter is the
49With the exception of the increase in the predicting power of both loans and broad money for
financial crises.
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only reason why we live in the ‘Age of Credit’.
7 Conclusions
Schularick and Taylor (2012) documented an increase in the ratio between credit and
broad money since the end of WWII, which they interpreted in terms of disconnect
between the two aggregates. I have demonstrated that this interpretation is incorrect,
since, as I have shown mathematically, this evidence is uninformative for the issue
at hand. In fact, Jordà, Schularick and Taylor’s data show that, since the XIX
century, fluctuations in broad money and credit have exhibited an extraordinarily
strong correlation within each single country in the dataset. I have also shown that,
after WWII, there has been no change in the relative prediction power of credit and
broad money for financial crises compared to the pre-WWII period. My results imply
that for the ‘traditional’ banking sector there has been no change, since WWI, in the
relationship between its monetary liabilities, and the amount of credit it extends
to the private non-financial sector; and only the comparatively recent ascent of the
shadow banking sector introduced a wedge between broad money and credit.
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